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Abstract: The Discourse on Inequality disputes the human-animal hierarchy in its denunciation of 
social inequality as unnatural. Stripping away social artifice, it reveals a deep physical continuity 
between man and animals. As embodied creatures, they share mortality and vulnerability. Human 
animality does not, however, negate human difference. Man differs from animals through perfectibility: 
the freedom to change. That difference comes from the lack of any specifically human property, 
thereby challenging rather than confirming anthropocentric hierarchies. Any properties seen to 
distinguish man from animals are in fact improper, contingent and artificial. Human impropriety 
renders man always dependent on external relations for his development. Compassion, vital for a 
Rousseauian approach to animal ethics, allows man to experience this relationality, transporting him 
towards others as he identifies with their suffering as recalling the finitude and vulnerability shared by 
all creatures. For Rousseau, human difference, I argue, enables rather than blocks identification with 
animality.  
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Rousseau’s discussion of the human-animal relation in the Discourse on Inequality 
emerges in his undertaking of the fraught task of differentiating what is essential or 
necessary to the human from what is artificial or socially acquired.1 This undertaking 
is important for his investigation into the foundation of social inequality. The 
Discourse can assert the fundamental equality of anyone and everyone only if it clears 
the grounds of society, only if it shows the radical contingency of that realm and its 
social divisions and classifications. This lack of any natural foundation for social 
inequality works to destabilise the hierarchies of strong/weak, rich/poor, government/ 
governed, dominant/subordinate around which society gets organised, highlighting the 
mutual dependence or mutual subjection which defines all relations of domination for 
Rousseau.2 The contestation of hierarchical structures is not restricted to inter-human 
relations. While the long title of the Discourse refers to inequality among men as its 
focus, the argumentation disputes all types of inequality, or relations based on the 
objectification of others, including that between humans and animals.   
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The clearing of social grounds to explore the origin of inequality also clears the 
grounds on which the human-animal hierarchy is based.  It subtracts institutions, 
relations, language, morals and laws which appear to separate us from other animals, 
which create the impression of human supremacy. Attributes such as reason, 
language, and moral awareness, which historically have been taken as confirmation of 
human superiority, are exposed as not natural or proper to humans. Humanity is 
defined by an absence of any specifically human property which allows for the 
freedom to change. The Discourse, I argue, exposes the impropriety of the human to 
challenge the attempt to identify a fixed difference of value between humanity and 
animality all the while suggesting the impossibility or undesirability of dissolving 
difference altogether.3 So while Rousseau’s discourse is pioneering in its affirmation 
of a degree of physical continuity between humans and other species, even 
conjecturing that man descended from apes, and also in its questioning of human 
exceptionalism, his work would reject the claim that ‘the human-animal distinction 
can no longer and ought no longer be maintained.’4  To abandon that distinction 
altogether would paradoxically deny animal otherness which can disrupt the sense of 
human mastery and unity underlying anthropocentrism and which also turns the 
animal into a question.   
 
Rousseau’s discussion of pity, explored in the final section of the article, highlights 
the importance of that distinction for the ethical dimension of the animal-human 
relation. A degree of human-centredness is essential for critiquing anthropocentrism 
in the first place. We cannot take responsibility for the ways a misplaced sense of 
human superiority has engendered the exploitation and destruction of other animals 
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without reflecting on how our own assumptions, actions or habits as human beings 
may have participated in this process. Compassion, in its humanised form, does not 
affirm humanity as much as questions it.  It begins from a disruptive encounter with 
another’s suffering that generates anxiety for ourselves, unsettling our sense of 
security or self-sufficiency through a visceral reaction to seeing another in pain. That 
reaction momentarily suspends the particular attachments, identifications and 
affiliations through which we understand ourselves and our place in the world and 
transports us outside ourselves towards others with whom we have no necessary 
connection but who can nonetheless still affect us. This movement without exposes us 
to the impropriety or otherness within as we come to experience others’ suffering as 
appealing to the embodied vulnerability and mortality which we share with all living 
creatures.  The ethical dimension of the human-animal relation, for Rousseau, does 
not begin from the question of the nature, the extent and value of animal suffering but 
more fundamentally from the inability of humans and other animals, as part of the 
living, not to be affected from without.  As we shall see, that inability problematises 
attempts to calculate with certainty whose suffering or life we should feel responsible 
for, to try to determine which species should command the most human concern. 
 
Human animality 
Rousseau devises the fiction of nature in his attempt to disentangle the natural from 
the artificial, the necessary from the contingent, the animal from the human.   This 
creates a paradox whereby the use of artifice becomes essential for depicting an 
original state. That paradox suggests how we can never conceive the social foundation 
in any pure or primary form because any conception of it will always already be 
traced through with what it allegedly founds and therefore should logically precede. 
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To think about what grounds society only makes sense from the perspective of what is 
grounded, from a perspective from within society. As a result, nature emerges as a 
social construct, losing any certainty, representing a ‘state which no longer exists, 
perhaps never did exist and probably never will exist’ (DOI, 125). The impossibility 
of thinking nature from anything but a social perspective resonates with the 
impossibility of thinking the animal from anything but a human perspective. Just as 
the accuracy of Rousseau’s account of nature lies with its uncertainty, objectivity, if 
there is any, in human accounts of animal others, perhaps lies in acknowledging the 
subjectivity which shapes those accounts, which renders them partial, modifiable and 
contestable. Rousseau’s discussion of the animal, which does much to refute 
anthropocentric hierarchies, is itself not beyond question: it is often reductive and 
homogenising.5 To believe that we could reach a neutral, totally non-anthropocentric 
understanding of animals would in fact close off the question of animality which any 
critique of anthropocentrism aims to raise and preserve.   
 
His avowedly fictional account of the origin refuses to offer objective grounds for 
what we recognise as marks of human identity. Instead, it points to the difficulty of 
demarcating when the human begins and the animal ends.  Stripped of social artifice, 
man becomes an animal, a physical being, governed by two pre-reflexive principles 
which operate like instincts: self-love (the impulse of self-preservation) and pity (the 
innate repulsion at witnessing suffering).  These instincts are common to all animals, 
identifying humans with other species through embodied finitude and vulnerability.  
Once man becomes socialised, he lives according to reason rather than instinct and 
therefore these principles, which seek to preserve life in common, need to be 
translated into laws and moral principles.  The physical continuity between man and 
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animals in Rousseau’s state of nature questions the anthropocentric hierarchy that 
indisputably privileges human over animal life or suffering, reconnecting humanity, 
through self-love and pity, with the living in general. So what is fundamental to man – 
the preservation of individual life and collective life – is also fundamental to animals.    
What divides them are artificial, historically acquired traits which, far from ensuring 
human supremacy, as we shall see, leave the status of humanity unstable.  Human 
identity is contingent and divided rather than essential and whole. It therefore cannot 
stand as the necessary and unified point of reference from which everything else 
differs just as the animal can no longer stand as the subordinate term that simply 
confirms human mastery. Humans and other animals are imagined as naturally equal 
in their striving for peaceful survival, and by extension, in their susceptibility to pain 
and death.      
 
 That the becoming animal of man, the portrait of him in nature, does not claim ‘any 
historical truth’ or show ‘the genuine origin’ of civilisation does not detract from its 
critical force (DOI, 132). Its overtly fictional status indicates the unknowability of 
human and animal nature and questions any assumptions hitherto made about it.  
Rousseau criticises philosophy for assuming too much about nature, objecting in 
particular to one philosopher’s assertion that ‘men are wolves and devour one another 
with clear conscience’.6  He does not see traits such as brutality, unconstrained 
appetites and irrationality, stereotypically associated with beasts, as natural to animals 
or humans for that matter. That association comes from the projection of socially 
corrupt human behaviour onto the natural realm.  Animals are sentient creatures 
which preserve themselves without causing unnecessary suffering. Violence and 
excess arise from denaturation.  For example, men learn to prey on one another ‘like 
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ravenous wolves’ in social situations of great inequality and injustice (DOI, 171). As 
Judith Still underlines, this comparison is not with ‘wolves in general’ but ‘with 
starving wolves who have been denatured by this extreme experience and thus turned 
to eaters of men’.7   Rousseau’s image of nature therefore refuses, as far as possible, 
to essentialise about the moral identity of humans and other animals. Governed by 
instinct, natural man and fellow creatures are amoral, neither good nor bad (150).  
Morality involves self-reflection, that is, the ability to appraise the impact of one’s 
actions on others. Deprived of the self-objectifying force of language, animals and 
natural man, while responsive to the pain of others, do not translate those responses 
into freely chosen actions and principles.  Morality does eventually become the 
preserve of human beings to the extent that they have the freedom to choose whether 
and how to respond to others. This privilege does not afford them greater moral worth 
but renders them permanently accountable. 
  
Man descended from apes 
The Discourse blurs the border between animality and humanity further, when his 
poetic account of our development from nature to society conjectures, without 
providing a fully-developed account of evolution, that humans may have descended 
from apes (DOI, n.X, 205).8 As Robert Wokler underlines, this was a radical idea at a 
time when his contemporaries were certain of the fixity of species and the undeniable 
qualitative difference between man and animals.9  For Rousseau, the physical 
diversity of human beings resulting from differences in climate, diet and lifestyles 
across the globe suggests that there could have been even more striking differences in 
the very distant past, that the bodily organisation of human beings may have known 
‘successive developments’ which had drawn it out of ‘the embryo of the species’.  
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Rousseau, however, never substantiates these speculative remarks with a detailed 
account of man’s physical evolution, insisting on the limited scope of comparative 
anatomy as a methodological tool and the uncertainty of naruralists’ observations ( 
134).    So how are we to understand Rousseau’s conjecture that our forebears may 
have been apes or more precisely orangutans given this insistence and his famous 
setting aside of ‘the facts’, his broad rejection of empirical data? (132).  Just as 
Rousseau’s fictional account of nature seeks to disrupt the self-evidence of social 
institutions and values, to deny them any objective foundation, humanity’s animal 
ancestry works primarily to disrupt the attempts by his predecessors to found human 
superiority on the alleged inferiority of animals, to decide the exact point when 
humanity begins.  
 
The great majority of scientific thinkers of Rousseau’s day (Tyson, Buffon, Bonnet 
Herder, Blumenbach), Wokler asserts, were convinced of the subhumanity of apes on 
the basis of their lack of reason and speech.10 For Rousseau, reason is not exclusive to 
humans: animals, for example, would not senselessly endanger themselves.  Similarly, 
their senses afford them a level of understanding grounded in materiality: a monkey, 
through the reception of sensory data, would be able to distinguish nuts from other 
food stuffs but, deprived of language, would not possess the abstract idea of the genus 
nut. In terms of understanding, man differs only ‘in degree’ from animals.  That 
partial difference comes from the fact that he mediates his sense impressions with 
language whose abstraction enables him to build ‘purely intellectual’ ideas that 
transcend materiality (DOI, 148).  However, language does not, Rousseau argues, 
prove the subhumanity of apes because language is not a trait inherent to humanity 
but something acquired.  The human is never identical to, or totally defined by 
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language. Language, for Rousseau, is a set of abstract signs whose meaning depends 
on common consent, on a common frame of reference (147). It therefore cannot be 
conceived as natural to man, for, based on convention, it already presupposes society. 
Likewise, society requires a shared vocabulary to designate commonly held objects, 
values, roles, institutions.  
 
The humanisation of the human animal 
Humans are not endowed with language as a property but are in fact deprived of a 
language which they fully inhabit.11 Language opens them to otherness, to reflection, 
society and culture but it does not define human nature for Rousseau, or suggest 
human supremacy. Man’s objectification in language allows him to distance himself 
from, or even supress his animality, as he transcends the materiality of nature to enter 
the realm of abstract ideas, to give sense to himself and to the world.  Language may 
not be natural to humans, but, it is necessary for their humanisation.   Rousseau 
depicts humanisation as a process of externalisation, so language, as the precondition 
and result of abstraction, is internal to it.  On the one hand, language enables us to 
overcome our self-immersion in nature, to open up to the outside as we begin to 
signify it, and on other, it can engender a false sense of mastery and closure to 
otherness.    Whereas the signs which shape our thoughts may be arbitrary, 
interchangeable and roughly equivalent in status, they enable us, according to 
Rousseau, to generate seemingly fixed hierarchical systems which privilege some 
terms over others such as human over animal; terms which come to structure social 
relations and institutions. For example, the famous speech act which opens the second 
part of the discourse depicts a cunning individual, the true founder of civil society, 
exploiting the abstract, metaphorical quality of language to invent the divisive fiction 
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of property. Property is fictional because the earth is fundamentally ‘no one’s’.  His 
assertion of ‘This is mine’ also means ‘this is not yours’. He addresses others only to 
mark himself off from them. The imaginary speech act founds property but also, at the 
same time, by exposing its contingency, unfounds it (DOI, 161).  Language allows 
man to invent and claim property, to differentiate himself from others, but even as he 
does so it reveals his impropriety, his dependence on an impersonal linguistic system 
to identify who he is and what is his own. Since his words become a description of 
reality only if they are understood and accepted by others, any claims he makes can 
always be rejected or challenged. His sense of himself and his share of the world is 
never entirely his own.  
 
While Rousseau questions the mine of humanity and the yours of animality, 
speculating about a deep historical connection between them, he does not, however, 
place them on the same ontological plane. He maintains human difference without 
granting that difference any positive or certain content. Human beings are 
distinguished from animals by their perfectibility, the almost unlimited freedom to 
change for better or worse. All other creatures, Rousseau conjectures, are endowed 
with instincts appropriate to their self-preservation. By contrast, humans lack any 
internal mechanism which determines their behaviour. Perfectibility designates our 
potentiality, our freedom to be always other than we are. Defining the human as 
potentiality excludes a state of completed humanisation either in the form of moral 
perfection or biological adaptation. Completion would suppress our humanity, that is, 
our always perfectible character.  
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The perfectibility proper to man means any attributes that he acquires are improper to 
him, that is, artificial and contingent.  Human impropriety implies that there is no 
nature original to man. Natural man is ultimately a fiction, already distinct from other 
animals by his potential for perfectibility, his freedom to deviate from nature.  He has 
to ‘observe’ and ‘imitate’ the ‘industry’ of other animals to survive, for whereas ‘each 
species has an instinct proper to it’, ‘man, perhaps having none that belongs 
exclusively to him, appropriates them all, feeds indifferently on most of the various 
foods, which other animals divide among themselves, and as a result finds his 
subsistence more easily than can any of them’ (DOI, 134-135). The boundary between 
natural/ artificial, instinct/imitation, proper/improper and animal/human becomes 
undecidable here. Human beings cannot claim anything as their own; what appears as 
their nature is always already copied and therefore paradoxically an improper nature.  
There is nothing truly original about man. He is never self-sufficient or unified, being 
always dependent on external support. As Stiegler underlines, he acquires skills, tools 
or techniques from without to supplement the originary lack of any specific human 
property from within.12 He is distinguished from animals only by what he lacks – a 
property that belongs exclusively to him – which in reality stops him from ever being 
properly human.  
 
As natural man is imagined as living at one with nature to the extent that his purely 
physical needs of hunger, thirst, procreation are immediately satiated, his 
perfectibility remains dormant.  Immediate satiation suppresses consciousness of 
temporal alteration and consequently the freedom to change. Change implies both an 
opening to the future as well as the memory of what has gone before in order to sense 
the difference of the now.13  Perfectbility gets activated by chance and alien 
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occurrences in the form of terrible storms and floods which destroy man’s natural 
plenitude, putting obstacles in the way of his survival and thereby bringing the 
question of how to survive, of his future into view.  Humanity senses the future, enters 
history, when it anticipates no future, death. Natural man, writes Rousseau, ‘would 
have died without having lived, and would have lived without having died’14.  Death 
paradoxically brings life alive.  To live means to be subject to temporal finitude, to 
survive after a period that has passed and retain the memory of that past for a future 
still to come. For this reason, death awakens perfectibility.  ‘Knowledge of death’ is 
therefore ‘one of the first acquisitions made by man in departing from his animal 
state’.  For while both man and animals are motivated by self-preservation, ‘no animal 
can know what it is to die’ (DOI, 142).  Rousseau therefore reproduces a commonly 
held frontier between them: consciousness of death.  However, that frontier becomes 
somewhat blurred when Rousseau remarks in Emile that ‘no one knows of his own 
experience what it is to die’.15  Humans may anticipate death but they do not know it. 
Consciousness of death does not ensure a clear division between humans and animals: 
they both share the impossibility of living death. The question of shared limits 
becomes, as we shall see, in my discussion of compassion, central for reflecting on 
the (im)possibility of identification.      
 
The risk of anthropocentrism? 
As we have seen, man’s humanisation depends on exposure to alterity, and that 
exposure discloses his inherent incompleteness. Being perfectible, humans are always 
future-oriented insofar as they are never fully determined. They have the potential to 
adapt to new contexts and challenges precisely because, unlike animals, they are not 
fundamentally adapted to anything specifically.  While Rousseau’s focus on 
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perfectibility rejects a traditional mode of anthropocentrism which opposes human 
plenitude with animal lack, it runs the risk of ushering in a more subtle form of it 
which defines man’s originary lack of property as grounding his capacity to acquire 
the skills, attributes, techniques which allow him to surpass animals and to establish 
himself as the measure of all things. Rousseau’s own account of the human-animal 
relation does not necessarily deny its human-centredness. However, the indeterminacy 
which enables the freedom and transformation coming from perfectibility excludes 
mastery and self-sufficiency: they would foreclose the potential for change defining 
humanity. The openness which makes humans forever susceptible to improvement 
also makes them forever susceptible to degeneration. ‘Perfectibility’, therefore, writes 
Rousseau, is ‘the faculty, causing over centuries man’s enlightenment and his errors, 
his vices and his virtues to bloom, which eventually makes him his own and nature’s 
Tyrant’ (DOI, 141 ).  
 
As human development has no predefined limits, no ultimate finality, history, as 
possibility itself, becomes the site both of our failure and our achievement. While 
perfectibility enhances our survival by giving us the capacity to develop technics to 
overcome obstacles to the preservation of the living, it can equally jeopardise it, 
allowing us to construct oppressive types of social organisation which subjugate, 
exclude and destroy human and animal life. Being future oriented, we understand the 
impact of our decisions only after the fact, through their effects. The deferred effect 
structuring our development indicates that there is nothing inexorable about our 
current situation. If we could totally predict the outcome of our actions or decisions, 
our defining potentiality would disappear and we would no longer need to decide 
anything at all, we would simply realise a pre-programmed set of tasks. We remain 
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forever responsible for our actions and decisions because we can never be certain of 
their outcome and therefore must always remain ready to critique them from the 
perspective of present events. Perfectibility makes us morally and politically 
accountable for ourselves and others because it excludes total mastery or self-
sufficiency. If nothing could ever disturb or afflict us, the question of responsibility 
would be become redundant, as we would have nothing to be responsible for. 
 
The ethical dimension of the human-animal relation: compassion 
 
The question of responsibility, of responsiveness or lack of it towards others arises in 
Rousseau’s theory of pity. That theory explores the (im)possibility of identification 
and is therefore essential for reflecting on the human-animal relation.  Compassion, 
for Rousseau, constitutes a vital component of humanity, representing our potential to 
move outside ourselves to identify with the plight of those different from us.  The 
significance of compassion in his philosophy means that ethical concern for other 
animals is not primarily grounded in objective reasons such as shared capacities, 
rights or biological similarities which call for their equal treatment, as it is for 
analytical philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan, although we may certainly 
derive principles from our compassionate responses.16 Rather, that concern is more 
relational, coming from an imaginative engagement with them as fellow creatures 
whose suffering we experience as appealing to pity.  
 
On this point, my reading of Rousseau anticipates Cora Diamond’s affirmation of the 
role of pity in animal ethics to counteract what she sees as the overly rationalistic 
approach of Singer and Regan. Her work retroactively exposes, without 
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acknowledging Rousseau, the importance of his theory for current debates. ‘Pity’, she 
argues, ‘beyond its primitive manifestations, depends upon a sense of human life and 
loss, and a grasp of the situations in which one human being can appeal for pity to 
another, ask that he relent.’  ‘The abstract appeal to the prevention of suffering as a 
principle of action’, she continues, ‘encourages us to ignore pity, to forget what it 
contributes to our conception of death and suffering’. 17  That appeal cannot 
exhaustively capture what generates a sense of moral concern, it cannot explain what 
moves us to a feeling of injustice when human and animal life is disrespected.  As 
Diamond argues, if the concern about eating meat, for example, simply reduced to the 
prevention of suffering, we would not find it wrong to eat those who have died from 
natural causes or accidents.  Animals, she argues in opposition, become morally 
considerable because we imaginatively project pity on to them. That projection 
includes them in the world of human feeling and meaning whereby their life and loss 
call forth a shared sense of finitude and vulnerability.  Pity initiates this sense of 
sharing by allowing us to place ourselves in others’ position so that we come to 
imagine our own potential for suffering in similar ways.  For Diamond, ‘horror of the 
conceptualising of animals as putting nothing in the way of their use as mere stuff’ 
relies on ‘a comparable horror at human relentlessness and pitilessness in the exercise 
of power’ towards humanity.18 Therefore, the importance we, as human beings, 
accord to our own lives and bodies, is not necessarily an obstacle to our feeling ethical 
responsibility towards animals. It does not prevent us from engaging seriously with 
their suffering but actually underpins the injustice we feel when their bodies are 
subjected to cruelty. 
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To ignore human difference in order to avoid the charge of speciesism is to ignore the 
perspective from which we relate to animal life. If animals become morally 
considerable only because we can prove that they have an equal interest in not 
suffering, their moral worth would hang in the balance, subject to proof or counter 
proof.19 Such an approach would not in fact exonerate itself of speciesism: humanity 
would still stand as the point of reference from which equality is measured.  For 
Rousseau, such reasoning would allow us to distance ourselves from the anguish we 
feel at the sight of their suffering.  Compassion depends on otherness and imagination 
rather than likeness and evidence.20 We need to identify with another’s suffering only 
because we do not immediately feel it or know exactly how it feels. Otherwise, the act 
of identification would be redundant. The impropriety of the human in the Discourse 
is central.  The absence of any specifically human property or identity forces us to 
identify with the outside, to adopt alien identities, in order to fill that absence. This 
process of self-externalisation therefore allows us to respond compassionately to 
others, to internalise their suffering as recalling own vulnerability to affliction or pain.  
But it also threatens compassion, possibly leading us to perceive others’ suffering as 
totally external to us, as of no moral consequence, as confirming our own relative 
security and superiority.  Rousseau’s theory surpasses Diamond’s by exploring more 
fully the ambiguity and fragility of compassion as the source of ethical responsibility.  
As we shall see, the conditions of possibility of pity also restrict it.     
 
For Rousseau, compassion is present in all animals despite its specifically human 
form. Natural compassion entails ‘an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature 
suffer’ (DOI, 152).  It consists of a visceral rejection of pain, of repulsion at 
witnessing life in a diminished or weakened form. Being pre-reflexive, it does not 
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involve interpreting what that reaction means and how to respond to it through time. It 
simply represents a primordial openness among the living which counteracts the 
egoism natural to man for Hobbes (151-2). It acts as a brake on the drive to self-
preservation, so that humans and other animals do not unnecessarily endanger one 
another in their bid for survival. Rousseau’s insistence on this form of compassion as 
natural, as undeniable, affirms the susceptibility to suffering that we share with 
animals.   
 
He depicts animals engaged in proto-ethical forms of behaviour which exceed the 
narrow range of actions (eating, sleeping, procreating) to which they are limited in 
other parts of the text: horses showing ‘reluctance to trample on living bodies’, the 
‘disquiet’ of one animal at the sight of the dead body of one of his species; some 
animals giving  ‘their fellows a sort of burial’;  the ‘mournful’ cries of cattle when 
they react to ‘the horrible spectacle’ of the slaughter house (DOI, 152). Images of 
untamed animals resisting captivity or enforced labour are also used to underline the 
unnaturalness of social man’s acquiescence to oppression (177). These scenes awaken 
us to the mortality, vulnerability and refusal of suffering that fundamentally 
(re)connect us to animals; they include animal life in the realm of human feeling and 
meaning, as part of a shared moral world.   
 
Rousseau’s discussion of animal compassion as rooted in a universal susceptibility to 
being affected or afflicted from without, aims to arrest, to destabilise the attempts 
depicted in his own portrayal of history, but also beyond, to establish hierarchies of 
moral worth. It exposes the disruptive force of affect which can initiate moral and 
political questioning and action.  For Rousseau, rational calculation does not therefore 
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ground ethical responsibility. ‘[I]t is reason’, he argues, ‘which turns [man] back upon 
himself, which divides him from everything that could disturb or afflict him’ (DOI, 
153). This turning away from affliction or disturbance does not deny natural 
compassion but affirms it through negation: we can turn away only if we have felt 
disturbed or afflicted at some point.   So while all animals are affected by others, 
humans, as perfectible creatures, can choose whether to respond, to decide which 
modes of political, moral or juridical action to take. That choice marks the emergence 
of the humanised form of compassion, enabling responsibility precisely because it 
also enables the possibility of turning away. Without that possibility, no one could 
decide to turn towards others and act on their call.   
 
Humanised compassion requires a reflexive act of comparison which involves 
imagination, meditation and reason, the very faculty which can both frustrate 
compassion as well as transform it into cause for action and reform.  Without the 
ability to reflect or compare, compassion would simply stop at the mere repulsion at 
suffering. The externalisation which humanises the human animal allows us to 
recognise others as other and thereby take account of our relations, and consequently 
be accountable for them. Rousseau does not deny human exceptionalism outright but 
does deny that it gives us mastery over the world. In fact, it implicates us consciously 
and deeply within it since we are always externally facing and thus never self-
sufficient. We are always in relation.21     
 
Pity gives us a heightened sense of relationality.  Its humanised form, as we have 
argued, entails a movement outside the self, the assuming of an alien identity, which 
rests on an act of imagination as we identify with what we do not feel directly in 
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ourselves.22   It does not produce oneness: we are transported towards others but do 
not fuse with them. If the experience of compassion involved our totally internalising 
others’ suffering, reproducing it identically, it would cancel itself out as we would or 
could no longer relate to them as other and would therefore no longer feel the anxiety 
within us of how to respond.  While reflective activity can suspend compassion, it is 
also essential for interpreting its meaning, for thinking through how to act on it 
morally and politically. So human compassion depends on what equally threatens its 
operation. While the difference between self and other make acts of compassionate  
identification possible, for Rousseau, it can equally short circuit as we experience that 
difference as indicating total separation or detachment, as we see their suffering as 
exclusively belonging to them and of no concern for ourselves (DOI, 75).  The 
uncertainty over how we respond to compassion does have an affirmative dimension, 
enjoining us to reflect on, to check and critique our responses. 
  
The significance of difference, spacing, imagination, over likeness, unity or 
immediacy for human compassion challenges attempts clearly to fix the limits of 
moral considerability, to decide exactly who or what is capable of suffering and to 
what extent they suffer as the basis of calculating whose suffering is worthy of 
consideration. This is not to say that Rousseau diminishes the importance of fairness 
or rationality for moral reasoning. He recognises that acts of compassion can never be 
unconditional or total but do and should, at times, involve limits so that we do not 
indiscriminately identify with anyone, including those that persecute or violate others. 
However, the attempt to calculate whether a particular animal other suffers in an equal 
way to us, or is equally aware of suffering as us would not be a valid line of enquiry 
for Rousseau. First, by presenting the self as the measure of the other, it would 
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suppress what Rousseau calls ‘the anxiety’ for the self.23 That anxiety is important for 
compassion since it brings us to question how our situation, our affiliations or values 
can lead us to deny suffering or perpetuate it. Secondly, such a line of enquiry does 
not pay sufficient attention to the finitude which conditions relating.   
 
My discussion of his theory of compassion advances a double argument about the 
self-other relation. On the one hand, our openness to human and other animals is 
always mediated through our own experience. On the other, we remain marked by an 
alterity that exceeds us: we can never fully assimilate or directly experience others’ 
suffering.  These limits prevent closure, leaving open the question of who or what the 
other is, and how we respond to others, or whether we respond at all.  The 
spontaneous compassion we share with all animals reinforces this openness. It stems 
less from the ability to suffer than from an inability not to be affected, afflicted, or 
disturbed by others. It involves a disruptive encounter with suffering which affects us 
before our attempts to calculate and establish the ethical status of that suffering, 
thereby unsettling the rational basis of those deductions.  Our animal vulnerability 
interrupts the potentially divisive and hierarchising work of human reason.   
 
Conclusion 
The Discourse aims to challenge all relations based on the subjugation and 
instrumentalisation of others by exposing the absence of any objective basis for social 
inequality.  To this end, it disputes the human-animal hierarchy.  The attributes which 
have been taken as confirmation of human superiority are exposed as improper to 
humanity, as supplementing the lack of any specifically human property.   Human 
impropriety refuses a clear division between humanity and animality while also 
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enabling man to take on traits, skills, identities that create contingent and artificial 
differences between them.  That process of differentiation is also one of self-
externalisation, allowing man to recognise and identify with otherness.  Human 
compassion exposes our capacity to move outside ourselves towards others. It allows 
us to experience both affectively and consciously our connectedness to fellow 
creatures.  Their suffering affects us from without, calling on us to identify with it as a 
mark of our own animal vulnerability from within.  It is our humanity which allows us 
to acknowledge and feel animality as part of us.  Compassion exposes the alterity 
which conditions relating, an alterity which marks the self as much as the other.  
While we cannot completely identify with others without destroying the otherness 
which simultaneously conditions and restricts identificatory acts, we can never 
completely close ourselves off to others without in some way affirming the openness, 
the force of the outside which that closing off tries to deny.  The Discourse appeals to 
us to recognise the embodied existence that we share with other animals as the reason 
to resist the oppression and degradation of life in society.  Its affirmation of human 
animality is an affirmation of the equality of anyone and everyone.      
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